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ABSTRACT 
Traditional signature-based malware detection is effective, but it can only identify 
known malicious programs. This thesis attempts to use machine-learning techniques to 
successfully identify previously unknown malware from a set of Windows 
executable programs. We analyzed the histogram of 4-, 8-, and 16-bit-sequence values 
contained in each program. We then analyzed the effectiveness of using these 
histograms in part or in full as feature vectors for machine learning experiments. We 
also explored the effect of an offset at the beginning of each program and its impact on 
classifier performance. We successfully show that a machine learning classifier can be 
learned from these features, with an f-measure in excess of 90% attained in one of our 
experiments. Using a part of the histogram as the feature vector did not significantly 
affect classifier performance up to a point, nor did including an offset. Our results also 
suggest that features derived from histograms are better suited to tree-based algorithms 
compared to Bayesian methods. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Traditional malware-detection software relies upon signatures derived from static 
analysis of the file or dynamic analysis of the program’s behavior. Though effective on 
known malware, signature-based analysis cannot identify previously unknown malicious 
programs, and when one considers that millions of new malicious programs are 
discovered every year, it becomes evident that better tools are needed. Part of United 
States Cyber Command’s most recent vision statement is hardening U.S. government 
networks (United States Cyber Command [USCYBERCOM], 2018). Critical to 
hardening of networks is speeding up the ability to detect malware on a host. This thesis 
builds on recent work in the fields of computer forensics and machine learning to detect 
malware, and explores the viability of using the frequencies of bit-sequence values 
occurring in a program to identify malware.  
Binary strings can be used to represent base-10 numbers, where the length of the 
string determines the range of values that can be represented. For example, a sequence of 
4 bits can represent base-10 numbers between 0 and fifteen. Our method examines how 
often each possible value of a bit sequence appears in a given file's raw binary. We then 
used this data as input to several machine-learning experiments to answer whether it 
possible to distinguish between malicious and benign programs by looking at their 
histograms (frequency distribution) of values for bit sequences.  
The remainder of this thesis is organized in the following way. Chapter II is an 
overview of current malware-analysis techniques, previous research attempts to increase 
the speed of malware analysis and identification, and attempts to automate malware 
classification and identification. It also includes a discussion of previous uses of 
histograms or frequency-based methods for malware classification. Chapter III describes 
our methodology, including our process for obtaining malware and non-malicious 
programs for testing, our method for generating histograms, and a description of the 
machine-learning algorithms used. Chapter IV describes results of our experiments. 
Chapter V provides our major findings and makes recommendations for future work.  
2 
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II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. EXECUTABLES 
Programs are used to make computers do things. Programs are written in human 
readable languages that computers cannot understand. To make these programs 
understandable to computers, the high-level source code is input to a compiler, which 
outputs a binary representation of the program known as the executable image (Anderson 
& Dahlin, 2011). The executable image, also known simply as the executable, is a series 
of machine code instructions written in binary, which can be immediately understood and 
executed by the computer’s central processing unit. Running executable files of unknown 
origin is dangerous from a security perspective, because the advertised behavior and 
actual behavior of the program may not be the same. However, it is difficult to examine a 
program and determine if it is malicious.  
B. MALWARE ANALYSIS 
The goal of our research is to improve automated malware identification, 
specifically for Windows executables. This research is built upon the analytical 
techniques used to dissect and understand malware. Malware analysis can be static or 
dynamic (Sikorski & Honig, 2012). Static analysis is performed by passive examination 
of the file. This usually means an examination of the raw binary machine language using 
a disassembler program or, if it is available, the source code of a malicious program. 
However, less technical observations such as the file name and file path can also provide 
insight or clues to identify malicious files (Rowe, 2015b). Dynamic analysis is conducted 
in a safe forensic environment known as a sandbox and looks for adverse behavior as the 
suspected malicious program executes.  
Static analysis can develop signatures such as hashes of known malicious 
programs or parts of programs, which can be used to identify previously analyzed 
examples of malware. Hashes are generated using a mathematical function that takes 
input data, such as a program or data file, and generates a unique alphanumeric output. 
Other things that can be extracted from programs are signatures, sequences of distinctive 
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bytes appearing in the program. Antivirus programs rely heavily on these signatures to 
identify files of concern. Unfortunately, malware developers have adapted by 
manipulating or obfuscating their code so that signatures are often changing.  
Signatures generated from dynamic analysis are sequences of system calls or 
other significant events observed in a malicious program. Dynamic analysis should be 
superior to static analysis because it allows the analyst to directly observe the behavior of 
the suspected malware. However, countermeasures for dynamic analysis can check to see 
if the program is being run in a forensic environment. This can be done by looking for 
common plugins associated with virtual machines, or checking if the execution 
environment has limited resources, which would indicate the use of a virtual machine as a 
sandbox (Sikorski & Honig, 2012). Another potential problem with dynamic analysis is 
that it relies on actually running the program. This is a time- and resource-intensive 
process that also risks infecting the machine with malware.  
C. CODE REUSE AND PROGRAM COMPARISON 
Understanding how similar two programs are is important for malware 
classification. Similarities between examples of malware can occur because the malware 
exploits the same vulnerability, is intended to perform a similar function, or displays the 
habits and idiosyncrasies of the individual malware developer. Similarities in malware 
also can occur due to the sharing and reuse of source code (Benjamin & Chen, 2013). 
Source code is shared and reused among authors to save effort and to expand the lifespan 
of particular malware. Malware authors will also often generate permutations of the same 
piece of malware to evade signature detection. All of these factors contribute to the rapid 
production rate of malware. 
Several studies have examined how different variants of the same malware can be 
compared (Adkins, Jones, Carlisle, & Upchurch, 2013; Hongyuan & Osorio, 2013; 
Seideman, Vargas, & Khan, 2014; Casey & Shelmire, 2014; Sarntinos, Benzaid, Arabiat, 
& Al-Nemrat, 2016)). These studies differ in what they are specifically comparing and 
how the two samples are compared. Adkins et al. (2014) and Sarantinos et al. (2016) 
generated composite hashes of programs and compared files based on the differences 
5 
between their composite hashes. Adkins et al. (2014) used a technique called basic block 
comparison which hashes parts of the file and then creates a composite hash-digest, while 
Sarantinos (2016) et al. used the ssdeep implementation of the fuzzy hashing algorithm to 
create a similar composite hash. Seideman et al. (2014) took a different approach, 
generating a system call trace and comparing programs based on the similarities of the 
programs' traces. Once the original program was summarized, statistical methodologies 
were used to compare the two files. One such method of comparison is the Jacquard 
index, which compares the intersection and the union of two sets and gives the fraction or 
percentage of the elements the two sets have in common. The Jacquard index can be used 
to determine how many common elements two files have (Adkins et al., 2013). It can also 
be used to identify code reuse in malware (Casey & Shelmire, 2014). A similar 
technique, the Jensen-Shannon distance, has been used to determine similarity in system 
call traces to classify malware in categories similar to biological genera (Seideman et al., 
2014). Entropy can also be used as a measure of comparison (Sarantinos et al., 2016). 
There are limits to these kinds of pattern matching because two programs with the 
same purpose can be represented many ways depending on the author, language, or 
compiler used. If pattern matching cannot be used to compare two programs, dynamic 
analysis is necessary to determine semantic equivalence. A program is said to be 
semantically equivalent to another if they execute identically. This is determined by 
observing the execution of each program to see if they both start and stop in the same 
state. This technique can be used on sections of programs to identify common functions 
or methods that are commonly reused (Hongyuan & Osorio, 2013). However, it is very 
difficult to apply. 
D. DISTRIBUTION OF MALWARE 
Looking at the extent of code reuse and the rapid rates of malware production 
might lead one to believe that our systems are inundated with malware. This is not 
necessarily the case. The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) maintains a large corpus of 
drives for the purpose of research in digital forensics. The corpus consists of 4000 drives 
containing 290 million files. Out of the files only about 0.11 percent of the files were 
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identified as malicious by one of five representative malware detection methods (Rowe, 
2015b). Several projects have used machine learning to recognize characteristics of 
malware executables (Choi, J., Kim, H., Choi, C., & Kim, H., 2011; Mira, Huang, & 
Brown, 2017). 
E. ATTRIBUTE EXTRACTION 
Feature (or attribute) extraction is the process of finding and defining the 
interesting phenomena contained in each element of a data set. For malware, this is the 
process of taking a file's binary and finding patterns by which a machine-learning 
algorithm can reach useful classifications or conclusions. These patterns are usually 
represented as ordered lists or vectors. Just as malware analysis can be static or dynamic, 
so too can the process of attribute extraction. Dynamic analysis observes the execution of 
the malicious program. This generates an attribute vector of system calls, libraries loaded, 
and other observable events. For example, one study extracted file-system writes, register 
operations, and network-access operations as its attributes (Cabau, Buhu, & Oprisa, 
2016). However, most malware studies use static analysis for attribute extraction due to 
its significant speed advantage. The most common static analysis technique is n-gram 
extraction, a technique from natural-language processing research which seeks to capture 
the dependencies between items in succession in a sequence (Russell & Norvig, 2010). 
When applied to malware detection, n-gram analysis can be performed using either the 
raw binary or the assembly language instructions. In their study, Zak, Raff, and Nichols 
(2017) found that byte code n-grams generalized better than n-grams using assembly 
language. Despite these findings, assembly language n-gram analysis remains popular 
with recent studies using “shingling” to increase performance (Hassen, Carvalho, & 
Chan, 2017). Shingling improves on n-gram analysis by introducing the concept of a 
break point in the dependency chain. It can be thought of like a paragraph break in 
writing where the last word of one paragraph and the first word of the next paragraph 
may or may not be related. Shingling reduces the length of the attribute vector.  
Another method of attribute extraction uses frequency of byte values. Two studies 
which used this method focused on sorting malware into families. Singh and Khurmi 
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(2016) analyzed portions of files, focusing on unique and likely repeated sequences of 
code, to create the attribute vectors while Yu et al. (2010) analyzed the entire file. The 
first compared the sum of Euclidian distances between attributes in two malicious 
programs to create a baseline for triaging malware into clusters, while the second 
leveraged a Symbolic Aggregation Approximation (SAX) to determine similarity 
between programs. 
F. MACHINE-LEARNING APPROACHES IN MALWARE ANALYSIS 
Machine learning is the process of programming computers to improve their 
performance without human assistance. Given the frequency of code reuse in malware, it 
is unsurprising that many studies have used machine learning to create classifiers that can 
differentiate between types of malware. Machine learning can also be used to distinguish 
malware from benign programs. Both of these problems require learning a classifier from 
a set of training data which includes examples of malicious and benign programs or 
examples of all of the types of malware being classified.  
Most machine learning is supervised, meaning that the training data are labeled 
with the correct classifications. Popular supervised learning techniques include support-
vector machines, tree-based classifiers, and Bayesian networks. Support-vector machines 
try to find an optimal decision boundary between two classes. Tree-based classifiers 
derive a series of yes-or-no questions based on the values of the attributes in the training 
data. Bayesian networks use compounding probabilities to predict the correct 
classification (Russell & Norvig, 2010). All these techniques have been used to derive 
classifiers for malware identification, and are often used as baselines when evaluating 
new techniques (Fuyong & Tiezhu, 2017). N-gram attributes derived from dynamic 
analysis have been used to train support-vector machines to distinguish between malware 
and benign software (Okane, Sezer, & McLaughlin, 2014). Similarly, n-gram attributes 
derived from static analysis machine code have been used to train the decision-tree 
random-forest algorithm to create a malware classifier (Usaphapanus & Piromsopa, 
2017).  
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Unsupervised learning differs from supervised learning in that the training data is 
not labeled with the correct classifications. Instead, unsupervised learning seeks to find 
patterns that exist in the data naturally. Unsupervised techniques include clustering and 
unsupervised neural networks (Kalash et al., 2018; Kargaard, Drange, Kor, Twafik, & 
Butterfield, 2018). In both of these studies, malicious binaries were converted to picture 
files prior to classification because there is much software available for picture 




The code we wrote appears in the Appendix. 
A. THE DATA SET STUDIED 
We derived our data set from the NPS “Real Drive Corpus.” The corpus consists 
of 4000 images of drives storing 290 million files. The corpus was compiled by 
purchasing secondhand drives from around the world. The primary purpose of this corpus 
is to facilitate research in computer forensics, with identification of malware being a 
significant focus (Garfinkel, Farrell, Roussev, & Dinolt, 2009). It enabled us to compile 
both our data set of malicious and benign executable files from a single source.  
The primary tool we used for working with the forensic corpus was the SleuthKit 
program developed by Brian Carrier (2018). SleuthKit includes a tool developed at NPS 
called Fiwalk which automatically extracts file directory information and associated file 
metadata (Garfinkel, 2009). We used Fiwalk to compile a list of executable files in the 
corpus with DLL and EXE extensions. After selecting a random subset from this list, we 
retrieved the actual files from the drive images in Expert Witness Disk Image Format 
(EWF) in the corpus using Sleuthkit's “icat” command. EWF is a popular file format for 
forensic images which meets the legal requirements of evidence preservation (Library of 
Congress, 2017). EWF files accurately preserve the total content of a drive, including 
deleted files and data stored in slack space. The icat command retrieves one file at a time, 
so we automated the collection process by writing a Bash shell script with a separate icat 
command for every file sought. Our final data set included 4835 Windows executables, 
of which 4436 were classified as benign and 399 were classified as malicious.  
Previous research on the corpus revealed that roughly 0.11 percent of the files in 
the corpus were malware, with a bit higher percentage for executables (Rowe, 2015b). 
We deliberately selected malware randomly with a higher percentage, so our random 
sample included roughly 8 percent malware. This is significantly different from earlier 
research which used approximately equal numbers of benign and malicious files in their 
data sets or used a majority of malicious files (Choi et al., 2011; Mira et al., 2017). 
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Having an equal number of malicious and benign programs in the data set reduces the 
chances the classifier would be biased toward malicious or benign programs. However, 
given the real-world origins of the NPS corpus, we thought it better to use a data set 
which reflected the corpus' ratio of malicious to benign programs. 
B. ATTRIBUTE EXTRACTION AND ARFF FILE GENERATION 
We needed to extract a set of attributes from each executable file in our data set so 
that it could be input to our machine-learning platform Weka. Weka is a machine-
learning workbench developed by the University of Waikato in New Zealand. It uses an 
input format known as Attribute Relation File Format or ARFF (Witten, Frank, & Hall, 
2011). An ARFF file has two parts. The first part is a header which includes the name of 
the data set, the attributes extracted from each executable in the data set, and the type of 
the data for the attribute (integer, real, string, or list of values). The second part is the data 
values of the attributes extracted from each executable. This set of values is called an 
attribute vector and is represented as an ordered list. To generate our ARFF files we 
wrote programs in Python 3 and ran them on a MacBook Pro running the MacOS High 
Sierra Operating system.  
A histogram is a set of counts on elements of a set. We generated histograms for 
bit sequences of 4, 8, and 16 bits within each executable file, and used those for the data 
in our ARFF files. To generate these histograms for 8-bit and 16-bit sequences, we used a 
program written by Prof. Rowe (2015a). To generate the histogram of 4-bit sequences, 
we wrote our own program using the Python Bitstring library. This library was necessary 
because Python will only work with byte-aligned data and will only process binary data 
at the byte level. The Bitstring library allowed us to create histograms of 4-bit values at 
offsets of 0-bit, 1-bit, 2-bits, and 3-bits. Because our data was byte-aligned, this left us 
with nonzero offsets with a final set of bits less than four which we ignored. The reason 
for generating multiple 4-bit histograms with varying offsets was that we hypothesized 
that including an offset would create a different distribution of counts, and wanted to see 
if including a given offset would provide significantly better or worse classifier 
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performance. We only generated offset ARFF files for the 4-bit sequence values as a 
proof of concept. 
Once we had generated our histograms, we generated our attribute vectors using 
two different methods. The first method normalized the counts in the histogram by 
dividing by the total count of the executable. We used this first method to generate six 
ARFF files: one for the 8-bit sequence, one for the 16-bit sequence, and one for each of 
the four 4-bit sequence offsets. We will refer to ARFF files generated using this first 
method as full-attribute because they contain an attribute vector which includes a value 
for each value represented in the executables' full histogram. Table 1 provides specific 
details on the six full-attribute ARFF files created using this first method. As the length 
of the bit-sequence, we were examining increased, so too did the length of the attribute 
vector, so that our full-attribute ARFF file contained an attribute vector of 65536 values. 
Though Weka was generally capable of handling this large number of attributes, the 
performance was slow and often required multiple tries to get Weka to successfully run 
the machine-learning algorithms using such a large input file. For this reason, we also 
experimented with a second method of attribute selection that explicitly tried to reduce 
the size of the attribute vector.  
Table 1. List of Full-Attribute ARFF Files 
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The second method used the bit sequences with the lowest nonzero counts as our 
attributes since these more likely indicate unique properties of an executable. To select 
the values for our attribute vector, we sorted the histograms by count from lowest to 
highest. We then selected increasingly large, but overlapping, subsets of the sorted 
histogram. Our selection criteria were simple in that we selected the value in the 
histogram with the smallest count greater than zero and then took the next specified 
number of values. This gave us a subset of the least frequently occurring values from the 
histogram which occurred at least one time. From the histogram of 4-bit sequence values, 
we selected three subsets. These subsets consisted of 4, 8 and 12 values. As previously 
stated these subsets were overlapping, so all of the attributes included in a smaller subset 
were included in any larger subsets. Each of these subsets was used as the attribute vector 
for its own ARFF file. We repeated this process using the histogram of 8-bit sequence 
values selecting subsets of 8, 16, 32, 64, and 128 values, and for the histogram of 16-bit 
sequence values selecting subsets of 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, 2048, 4096, 8192, and 
16384. We will refer to ARFF files generated using our second method as reduced-
attribute because they contain a subset of the executables' histogram. Table 2 details the 
18 reduced-attribute ARFF files generated using this second method. We did not generate 
any reduced-attribute ARFF files from the histograms which included an offset.  
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Table 2. List of Reduced-Attribute ARFF Files Generated 
After the attribute vectors were generated, the associated executables needed to be 
tagged as malicious or benign. This was done by comparing an executable’s hashcode to 
those in the malware libraries of Bit9, Open Malware, Virus Share, Symantec, and Clam 
AV using the data on from the NPS Real Drive Corpus (Rowe, 2015b).  
C. MACHINE-LEARNING METHODS 
Weka implements a wide range of well-known machine-learning algorithms. Our 
experiments primarily used tree-based classifiers. We used the J48, logistic-model-tree 
(LMT), random-tree, random-forest, and reduced-error-pruning (REP) tree classifiers. 
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We also experimented with the Naïve-Bayes and Bayesian-network classifiers. All 
classifiers were trained using 66 percent of the data set and evaluated on the remaining 34 
percent; this approach could be easily extended to do cross-validation to obtain more 
accurate performance measures. We use the term “experiment” to describe a pairing of an 
input ARFF file and a machine-learning algorithm. We paired each of our 24 ARFF files 
with each of the 7 classifiers, for a total of 168 experiments. Five of these experiments 
did not return results, either due to raising an error or failing to fully execute.  
D. PRECISION, RECALL, AND F-SCORE 
Precision is the proportion of correctly classified instances of a class compared to 
the total number of instances classified as the class (Witten et al., 2016). In our 
experiments, this meant the number of malicious files identified divided by the number of 
total files classified as malicious. Recall is the proportion of correctly classified instances 
of a class compared to the total number of instances of that class in the data set (Witten et 
al., 2016). In our experiments, this meant the number of malicious files correctly 
identified as malicious divided by the total number of malicious files in the data set. 
Precision and recall are generally viewed as competing statistics, where maximizing one 
minimizes the other (Witten et al., 2016). To get a kind of average of these competing 
metrics, we also used the F-score which is their harmonic mean. It is calculated as two 
times the product of the recall and precision divided by their sum.  
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IV. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
A. CLASSIFIER PERFORMANCE USING FULL-ATTRIBUTE ARFF FILES 
Figures 1, 2, and 3 display the precision, recall, and F-score for experiments we 
conducted using the histogram of values generated for 4, 8, and 16-bit values. The Naïve 
Bayes classifier provided the highest recall but the lowest precision. Across all bit-
sequence lengths, the five tree classifiers of J48, random-tree, random-forest, LMT, and 
REP outperformed the two Bayesian classifiers, with the random-forest classifier 
performing best across all bit-sequence lengths in both precision and F-score. This is 
likely due to random-forest being the only classifier which uses bagging, or training using 
multiple independent data sets, to boost performance (Russell & Norvig, 2010). Of note, 
the best overall performance for F-score was from the 4-bit ARFF file using the random-
forest classifier. This was the best F-score noted for all experiments performed and the 
only F-score that exceeded 90 percent. With this exception, the overall performance of all 
classifiers remained consistent across bit-sequence length.  
Figure 1. Precision Performance of Full-Attribute Classifiers 
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Figure 2. Recall Performance of Full-Attribute Classifiers  
 
Figure 3. F-score Performance of Full-Attribute Classifiers  
We were not able to get results for all seven of the classifiers for all three full-
attribute ARFF files that did not include an offset. When we tested both the 16-bit and 8-
bit full-attribute ARFF files using the Bayesian-network classifier, Weka raised an error 
for overlapping bin ranges, which is strange because Weka automatically selects bin 
ranges based on the range of values observed in the attribute vector. When we tested the 
16-bit full-attribute ARFF file using both the LMT and REP classifiers, Weka interrupted 
program execution without raising an exception or outputting any results.  
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B. THE IMPACT OF OFFSETS ON CLASSIFIER PERFORMANCE 
Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the precision, recall, and F-score statistics for using the 
four 4-bit-full-attribute ARFF files that were generated with the varying 0-bit, 1-bit, 2-bit, 
or 3-bit offsets. Overall, the results of the offset experiments follow the same trend noted 
in the other full-attribute experiments. Tree classifiers outperformed Bayesian classifiers, 
with random-forest providing the best results for both precision and F-score. No clear 
benefit from offsetting the start point of the binary string is evident from the data, except 
that the Bayesian-network classifier saw an increase in precision as the offset was 
increased. This did not generate a corresponding increase in F-score.  
Figure 4. Classifiers’ Precision Performance for 4-bit Full-Attribute-Offset 
Experiments 
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Figure 5. Classifiers’ Recall Performance for 4-bit Full-Attribute-Offset 
Experiments 
Figure 6. Classifiers’ F-score Performance for 4-bit Full-Attribute-Offset 
Experiments 
C. REDUCING ATTRIBUTE VECTOR LENGTH 
To test whether a reduced number of attributes changed the performance of a 
classifier, we used the 18 ARFF files generated using our second method of attribute 
selection. When we examined those files, we noticed, particularly in ARFF files that had 
more than 512 values in their attribute vector, that the number of executables represented 
in the ARFF file did match with the total number of executables in our data set. To 
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investigate this phenomenon further, we generated a bar chart, Figure 7, displaying the 
number of executables included in each ARFF file.  
 
Figure 7. Comparison of the Number of Executables Captured in Our 
Reduced-Attribute Data Sets 
A sharp drop-off in the number of executables included in each ARFF file is 
evident in the 16-bit-reduced-attribute ARFF files with an attribute vector containing 
greater than 512 values. This drop-off is concerning because it is indicative of a logical 
flaw in our attribute extraction methodology. None of the reduced-attribute ARFF files 
contains the full set of executables contained in our data set. The likely cause of this is 
that our program included a check to see if each attribute vector generated by our 
program contained a sufficient number of values to be included in an ARFF file. If an 
attribute vector failed that check, it was not included in the ARFF file. For example, if we 
wanted to generate an ARFF file containing an attribute vector with 32 values, but only 
31 specific bit-sequences had a count greater than zero, that executable would not be 
included in the ARFF file. This casts significant doubts on how effective our attribute 
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reduction method is. If every executable cannot be represented using our attribute 
selection method then not every executable can be classified using our methodology. 
Practically this means that some malicious files may not even make it to the classification 
stage and thus have no chance of being detected by our methodology.  
1. Classifier Performance on 4-Bit Reduced-Attribute ARFF Files 
Figures 8, 9, and 10 display the results for our 4-bit reduced-attribute 
experiments. The overall trend of tree classifiers outperforming Bayesian classifiers is 
evident in this data and consistent with the previous experiments using the full-attribute 
vector length. Random-forest continued to provide the best results in precision and F-
score, while random-tree provided the best results for recall. By contrast, in the full-
attribute experiments the Naïve-Bayes classifier provided the best results for recall. 
Reducing the attribute vector length from 12 to 8 did not cause a decline in performance 
across all classifiers and metrics, but reducing the attribute vector length from 8 to 4 
caused a greater than 50 percent drop in F-score across all classifiers.  
 




Figure 9. Classifiers’ Recall Performance for 4-bit Reduced-Attribute 
Experiments  
 
Figure 10. Classifiers’ F-score Performance for 4-bit Reduced-Attribute 
Experiments  
Precision and F-score could not be calculated for the 4-bit-reduced-attribute-4 and 
4-bit-reduced-attribute-8 Naïve-Bayes experiments and the 4-bit-reduced-attribute-4 
Bayesian-network experiments because in all three of these experiments the classifier 
identified all executables as benign resulting in a divide by zero error.  
2. 8-Bit Reduced-Attribute Experiments 
Figures 11, 12, and 13 show the results for our 8-bit reduced-attribute 
experiments. The tree classifiers outperformed Bayesian classifiers in these experiments 
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as well. Random-forest continued to provide the best performance in precision and F-
score, while random-tree provided the best results for recall. In both random-tree and 
random-forest, reducing the attribute vector length had very limited effects on the 
classifier's performance.  
 
Figure 11. Classifiers’ Precision Performance for 8-bit Reduced-Attribute 
Experiments  
 




Figure 13. Classifiers’ F-score Performance for 8-bit Reduced-Attribute 
Experiments  
3. 16-Bit Reduced-Attribute Experiments 
Figures 14, 15, and 16 show the results for precision, recall, and F-score for our 
16-bit reduced-attribute experiments. There was considerable variability in the precision 
and recall performance for all the classifiers as the attribute vector length increased from 
32 to 16384. Despite this variability, the results for F-score were relatively constant and 
consistent with the results from the full-attribute and 8-bit and 16-bit reduced-attribute 
experiments. Tree-based classifiers continued to outperform Bayesian classifiers and 
random-forest provided the best performance in terms of F-score and precision. The 
Naïve-Bayes classifier provided the best results in terms of recall.  
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Figure 14. Classifiers’ Precision Performance for 16-bit Reduced-Attribute 
Experiments 
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V. CONCLUSIONS  
The data from our experiments suggests that histograms of bit-sequence values 
can distinguish between malware and benign programs. However, classifier performance 
must be improved if it is to be a useful tool in the fight against malware. One way could 
be to expand or balance the data set used to train our data. In our experiments, we had 92 
percent benign programs and 8 percent malware.  
Our data suggests that bit-sequence length is a relatively unimportant factor. 
Reducing the attribute space, to a point, did not seem to degrade classifier performance. 
Future work to identify the best way to reduce the attribute vector length and file size 
would be useful. Our experiments only looked at two types of machine-learning 
algorithms, tree and Bayesian classifiers. Our data suggests that tree algorithms learn 
from frequency-based attributes better than Bayesian algorithms do. Our experiments 
also used only Windows-executable files. Future work should use a more diverse data set.  
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APPENDIX. PROGRAM CODE 
A. PROGRAM TO GENERATE BASH FILE TO RETRIEVE FILES FROM 
NPS REAL DRIVE CORPUS 
def BashGenerator(inputFile, outputFile): 
    offsets = open(inputFile, "r", encoding = "UTF-8") 
    out = open(outputFile, "w", encoding = "UTF-8") 
    out.write("echo OFF\n") 
    out.write("echo Retrieving Files\n") 
    for line in offsets: 
        a = line.split("|") 
        out.write('icat -r -i ewf -o '+ a[3][:-1] + ' "/corp/nus/
drives/'+a[1][0:2]+"/"+a[1]+"/"+a[1]+'.E01" ' + a[2] +' >"erwert/'+a[0]+'.exe"\n') 
    out.write("echo Finished") 
    offsets.close() 
    out.close() 
    return print("Done") 
def MergeFunction(input1, input2, output1): 
    a = open(input1, "r", encoding = "UTF-8") 
    b = open(input2, "r", encoding = "UTF-8") 
    c = open(output1, "w", encoding = "UTF-8") 
    a1 = a.readlines() 
a.close()
    b1 = b.readlines() 
b.close()
    for line1 in a1: 
        for line2 in b1: 
            aa = line1.split("|") 
            bb = line2.split("|") 
            if bb[1] == aa[0]: 
c.write(bb[0] + "|" + bb[1] + "|" + bb[3] + "|" + aa[1])
    c.close() 
    return print("Done") 
print("Running Function 3") 
function3("best_offsets_for_drives.txt", "exe_inode_data_rdc.txt",
"ReadyForFunction1.txt") 
print("Done Running Function 3") 




B. PROGRAM TO GENERATE 8-BIT FULL-ATTRIBUTE DATA 
import sys, math, hashlib, os 
def endclean(OS): 
    S = OS 
 M = len(S) 
    while ((M > 0) and \ 
           (S[M-1] in ['\n','\r','\t','\f','\a','\b','\v',' ']) ): 
        S = S[0:M-1] 
        M = M-1 
    return S 
def bytedistrib(filename):   
    bytedist = [0 for i in range(256)] 
    count = 0 
    fid = open(filename, 'rb') 
    byte = fid.read(1) 
    while byte: 
        k = int(ord(byte)) 
        bytedist[k] = bytedist[k] + 1 
        byte = fid.read(1) 
        count = count + 1 
    fid.close() 
    line = "" 
    for x in bytedist: 
        line += str(x/count) + ", " 
    return line 
if __name__=="__main__": 
    benign_dir = sys.argv[1] 
    mal_list = sys.argv[2] 
    out = sys.argv[3] 
    outputdir = {} 
    outfile = open(out, 'w') 
    outfile.write("@RELATION Single_Byte\n") 
    mal1 = open(mal_list, "r", encoding = "UTF-8") 
    mal2 = mal1.readlines() 
    mal_files = set() 
    for line in mal2: 
        mal3 = line.split("|") 
        mal_files.add(mal3[1][:-1]) 
    for i in range(256): 
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        outfile.write("@ATTRIBUTE " + str(i) + " NUMERIC\n") 
    outfile.write("@ATTRIBUTE class {benign, malware}\n") 
    outfile.write("@data\n") 
    for filename in os.listdir(benign_dir): 
        full_path = str(benign_dir) +"/"+ str(filename) 
  if os.path.isfile(full_path): 
            outputdir[full_path] = bytedistrib(full_path) 
        if full_path in mal_files: 
            outputdir[full_path] += "malware\n" 
        else: 
            outputdir[full_path] += "benign\n" 
    for key in outputdir: 
        outfile.write(outputdir[key]) 
C. PROGRAM TO GENERATE 16-BIT REDUCED-ATTRIBUTE DATA 
import sys, math, hashlib, os 
def endclean(OS): 
    S = OS 
    M = len(S) 
    while ((M > 0) and \ 
           (S[M-1] in ['\n','\r','\t','\f','\a','\b','\v',' ']) ): 
        S = S[0:M-1] 
        M = M-1 
    return S 
def bytedistrib(filename):        
    bytedist = [0 for i in range(65536)] 
    bigramLib = {} 
    count = 0 
    features_List = [] 
    fid = open(filename, 'rb') 
    byte1 = fid.read(1) 
    while byte1: 
        byte2 = fid.read(1) 
        if byte2: 
            k = (int(ord(byte1))*256)+int(ord(byte2)) 
            bytedist[k] = bytedist[k] + 1 
            byte1 = fid.read(1) 
        else: 
            byte1 = byte2 
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        count = count + 1 
    fid.close() 
 
    for i in list(range(65536)): 
        a = bytedist[i] 
        if a not in bigramLib: 
            bigramLib[a] = [i] 
        else: 
            bigramLib[a] += [i] 
     
    for i in range(1,count): 
        if i in bigramLib: 
            features_List += bigramLib[i] 
    #features_list returns a list of bigrams which 
    # had the lowest non 0 count in the file (smallest keys) 
    return features_List 
        
 
if __name__=="__main__": 
    benign_dir = sys.argv[1] 
    mal_list = sys.argv[2] 
    out = sys.argv[3] 
    outputdir = {} 
    mal1 = open(mal_list, "r", encoding = "UTF-8") 
    mal2 = mal1.readlines() 
    mal_files = set() 
    Feature_count = int(sys.argv[4]) 
    outfile = open(out, 'w') 
    outfile.write("@RELATION BIGRAMS "+str(Feature_count)+"\n") 
                   
    for line in mal2: 
        mal3 = line.split("|") 
        mal_files.add(mal3[1][:-1]) 
         
    for i in range(Feature_count): 
        outfile.write("@ATTRIBUTE " + str(i) + " NUMERIC\n") 
    outfile.write("@ATTRIBUTE class {benign, malware}\n") 
    outfile.write("@data\n") 
    for filename in os.listdir(benign_dir): 
        full_path = str(benign_dir) +"/"+ str(filename) 
        if os.path.isfile(full_path): 
            write = False 
            a = bytedistrib(full_path) 
            b = [] 
            if len(a) > Feature_count: 
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                write = True 
                for i in range(Feature_count): 
                    b += [a[i]] 
                line = "" 
                for x in b: 
                    line += str(x) + ", " 
 
                outputdir[full_path] = line 
 
        if write == True: 
            if full_path in mal_files: 
                outputdir[full_path] += "malware\n" 
 
            else: 
                outputdir[full_path] += "benign\n" 
             
    for key in outputdir: 
        outfile.write(outputdir[key])  
 
D. PROGRAM TO GENERATE REDUCED-ATTRIBUTE 8-BIT DATA 
import sys, math, hashlib, os 
 
def endclean(OS): 
    S = OS 
    M = len(S) 
    while ((M > 0) and \ 
           (S[M-1] in ['\n','\r','\t','\f','\a','\b','\v',' ']) ): 
        S = S[0:M-1] 
        M = M-1 
    return S 
 
def bytedistrib(filename):    
    bytedist = [0 for i in range(256)] 
    count = 0 
    fid = open(filename, 'rb') 
    byte = fid.read(1) 
    ByteLib = {} 
    features_List = [] 
    while byte: 
        k = int(ord(byte)) 
        bytedist[k] = bytedist[k] + 1 
        byte = fid.read(1) 
        count = count + 1 
    fid.close() 
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    #print('Analyzing file',filename,'pf',count,'bytes') 
    #print('Byte distribution:',bytedist) 
    for i in list(range(256)): 
        a = bytedist[i] 
        if a not in ByteLib: 
            ByteLib[a] = [i] 
        else: 
            ByteLib[a] += [i] 
     
    for i in range(1,count): 
        if i in ByteLib: 
            features_List += ByteLib[i] 
    #features_list returns a list of bigrams which 
    # had the lowest non 0 count in the file (smallest keys) 
    return features_List 
         
  
if __name__=="__main__": 
    benign_dir = sys.argv[1] 
    mal_list = sys.argv[2] 
    out = sys.argv[3] 
    outputdir = {} 
    mal1 = open(mal_list, "r", encoding = "UTF-8") 
    mal2 = mal1.readlines() 
    mal_files = set() 
    Feature_count = int(sys.argv[4]) 
    outfile = open(out, 'w') 
    outfile.write("@RELATION SingleByte "+str(Feature_count)+"Feature\n") 
                   
    for line in mal2: 
        mal3 = line.split("|") 
        mal_files.add(mal3[1][:-1]) 
         
    for i in range(Feature_count): 
        outfile.write("@ATTRIBUTE " + str(i) + " NUMERIC\n") 
    outfile.write("@ATTRIBUTE class {benign, malware}\n") 
    outfile.write("@data\n") 
    for filename in os.listdir(benign_dir): 
        full_path = str(benign_dir) +"/"+ str(filename) 
        if os.path.isfile(full_path): 
            write = False 
            a = bytedistrib(full_path) 
            b = [] 
            if len(a) > Feature_count: 
                write = True 
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      for i in range(Feature_count): 
b += [a[i]] 
line = "" 
for x in b: 
line += str(x) + ", " 
outputdir[full_path] = line 
        if write == True: 
            if full_path in mal_files: 
outputdir[full_path] += "malware\n" 
            else: 
outputdir[full_path] += "benign\n" 
    for key in outputdir: 
        outfile.write(outputdir[key]) 
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